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CURRENT LEGISLATION
Editor-LAwRENCE T. GRESSER, JR.
BANKING LAW-RESUMPTION OF BUSINESS BY CLOSED INSTI-
TUTIONs.-Since the creation of the office of superintendent of bank-
ing as part of the executive branch of our state government, it has
been the province of the superintendent to close and take over an in-
solvent or faultily managed banking institution.' If at any time
after such a closing he thought it would benefit all concerned to
permit a resumption of business, he has had the power to surrender
possession, and order such safeguards in the future operation of
the bank as he deemed proper.2 To some extent the present ses-
sion of the legislature has clarified this last phase of his duty.3
A new subdivision has been added to Section 61 of the Banking
Law. It empowers the banking superintendent to permit a closed
bank or trust company to be reopened on terms and conditions
agreed on between him and its directors, subject, however, to con-
ditions therein enumerated.
Instead of liquidating a closed institution, if the superintendent
deems it in the interest of depositors and others interested in its
affairs, he may determine the value of its sound assets, and list
some of them for the purpose of making payments to depositors.4
When the bank reopens, however, it may pay to each of its de-
positors at the time of closing, only eighty per cent of his propor-
tionate share of the value, as determined by the superintendent,
of the listed assets.5 Whether or not he withdraws this permissible
amount, the bank must immediately issue to each above-mentioned
depositor a -non-negotiable transferable certificate representing the
remaining proportion of his account not subject to withdrawal.6
These certificates bear interest at three per cent. They may not be
taken up by the bank until the superintendent shall determine that
through its renewed business activity its total sound assets above
all deposits subject to withdrawal have increased, and are greater
than the excess of sound assets over deposits subject to withdrawal at
the time of reopening. 7 This increase of assets may then be utilized
to make pro rata payments on certificates; first on interest, and after
payment of interest in full, on principal. Meanwhile, no dividends
may be declared until all the outstanding certificates shall have been
paid or provision therefor made.8
'In re S. Lungbino & Sons, 176 App. Div. 285, 163 N. Y. Supp. 9 (4th
Dept. 1917).
'N. Y. BANKING LAW (1909) §61, subd. 1.
'N. Y. BANKING LAW (1933) §61, subd. 2; §69a.
'Ibid. §61, subd. 2a.
r Ibid.
'Ibid. §61, subd. 2c.
.Ibid.
' Ibid. §61, subd. 2d.
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Within sixty days after the resumption of business, a meeting
for the election of new officers and directors must be held.9 Old
office-holders will be eligible for re-election. The holders of cer-
tificates shall be entitled to vote, as though possessor of stock of
the same pro value as the face amount of the certificate.10  But
at any time such certificate, at the option of the holder, may be sur-
rendered for capital stock of an equal book value."- When
these certificates are either paid or exchanged for stock, or when
the superintendent may determine the condition of the bank to be
such that it may safely continue business, he may permit its con-
tinuance in the ordinary course as though he had never taken
possession.'
2
The section as a whole is clear and easily understandable. But
the wording is somewhat confused where it directs the superintendent
as to the assets to list subject to withdrawal. It apparently limits
the depositors' interest to "such of its (the banks) assets as he
may determine to be sound, and may list for the purpose of * * *
such payments." This gives the superintendent the power to deter-
mine which of the assets are to be subject to the call of depositors,
and to set aside the rest for other creditors and stockholders-an
important power when we remember that the decision of the super-
intendent is not subject to judicial review.' 3  However, the deposi-
tors' interest is safeguarded by a voice in the re-establishment and
re-management of the business; and the option granted him to trade
in his voting certificate for capital stock at any time, seems to pre-
sent him an opportunity to recover his loss in the deposits by a
speculation on the rise in value of the bank's stock.
Times of stress often produce fundamental and far-reaching
changes in things. Out of the public clamor due to the high re-
ceivers' fees incident to bank failures in the panic of 1908, arose
the idea of a state official to act as liquidator.' 4  The present-day
crisis has vividly shown the relation between deflation and security
dumping as a result of enforced liquidation. Together with the
newly created power of the superintendent to pledge a bank's assets
as security for a loan, 15 the bill under consideration will tend to
alleviate the folly of emptying good sound securities on a loaded
market and forcing down the value of all securities, in order to ob-
tain cash to meet part payments to denositors. By these sections
our legislature has attempted to meet this condition, and to better
safeguard the interests of depositors through conservation of assets.
9 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
'Ibid. §61, subd. 2e. This subdivision also provides the authority for the
necessary increases in capital stock, and recites the mechanics of the changes
and filing requisites.
'
2 Ibid. §61, subd. 2g.
"Supra note 1.
24 Ibid.
" Supra note 3, §69a.
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If the duties of the office of superintendent of banks are wisely
carried on in the future as in the past, we are sure that the trend
will be toward fewer liquidations and greater conservation of banks,
with increasing resumption on a sound financial basis.
LAWRENcE T. GRESSER, JR.
PROPOSED CHANGE IN PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW: RE WAGE
ASSIGNMENTS.-The wage assignment has been condemned by econo-
mists and social workers for many years; courts have.admitted the
evils but have been constrained from acting until the legislature
should take the proper steps. It has brought poverty to many homes;
workers have been deprived of their positions. The disastrous re-
sults of such assignments and their viciousness have been the sub-
ject of much discussion. The seizure of an employee's entire wage
is a condition that must be remedied.' The question is as to the
best method of accomplishing that ideal.
Because of such appalling conditions employers have attempted
to prevent their employees from making wage assignments by means
of a contract between themselves. In an Illinois case the highest
court of that state held such a contract to be of no effect as being
against public policy.2 The New York courts have followed the
same theory. Still, in a recent case, Mr. Justice Untermyer stated
that an employer or any contracting party should not be denied the
right to protect an interest so manifest, by means so reasonable, un-
less some principle of public policy or some statute inexorably
requires it.3 He could not see that such a contract offended on
either ground. But one judge held that an agreement of that type
would be invalid under the Personal Property Law,4 and that it
would be nugatory and against public policy.5 The Court of Ap-
peals has not, as yet, decided the point. It is doubtful that they
would hold contra to the Illinois court.
As the necessity is clear for some action on the question the
legislature has proposed to add a new section to the Personal Prop-
erty Law.6 The bill as introduced into the legislature provides that
wage assignments securing indebtedness aggregating less than one
thousand dollars must be contained in separate written instrument
identifying the transaction, that no other assignment or order ex-
ists in connection therewith and that wages amount to at least twelve
Legal Aid Society Annual Report (1932) Report of the President, p. 12.
2 State St. Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 345 Ill. 160, 177 N. E. 702
(1931).
'Sacks v. Neptune Meter Co., 144 Misc. 70, 255 N. Y. Supp. 254 (1932).
'PERsoN A. PROPErTY LAw §41.
Su*pra note 3.
0 N. Y. Lzris. INDEx (1933) Int. No. S381, A. 444-Pr. No. S385, A. 451.
